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Universities are spaces where knowledge is shared and where great scientific and technological discoveries are generated through scientific research. The purpose of scientific research is to provide knowledge and resources that contribute to the advancement of humanity. In some cases, the research process involves the production and handling of highly sensitive and confidential information, so scientists are required to avoid being influenced or compromised by political or social interests; a case of academic dishonesty in such situations can lead to international incidents.
In previous articles, we have discussed how the geopolitical landscape can affect the work and even the physical integrity of academicians from various areas of knowledge. These situations usually occur before the constant fear of political regimes about the misuse of information that could compromise the national security of entire countries. Below we present three cases in which malpractices and improper handling of confidential information spread beyond the academic field to become a conflict among nations.
A conflict over a statement of funds
Last Tuesday, February 11, U.S. federal authorities arrested Charles Lieber, one of the world’s leading nanotechnology experts. The scientist maintained his position as Chairman of the Chemistry department at the University of Harvard when he accepted an advisory position at Wuhan University in China. The aim was to support the university in the founding of a laboratory and to create strategic visionary research proposals.
According to reports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Dr. Lieber received $15 million in funding from the U.S. Institute of Health and the Department of Defense; at the same time, his employers in China were paying him $50,000 a month in research funds that the scientist missed to report. A huge conflict because, in the United States, every researcher must disclose whether he receives funding from other countries. After finding this cover-up, the Department of Defense questioned Dr. Lieber in this regard, who, in turn, provided false information. Lieber is currently suspended from his position at Harvard and faces federal charges for lying to the Department of Defense.
A possible case of successful espionage?
Yanqing Ye worked as a researcher in the Department of Physics, Chemistry, and Medical Bioengineering at Boston University until April 2019, when Dr. Ye subsequently returned to China. Problems with her stay recently emerged when U.S. federal prosecutors announced that in the application for her visa, the scientist hid her position as a lieutenant in the People’s Liberation Army, the national army of the People’s Republic of China. However, her curriculum vitae, which she presented to Boston University at the time of applying, included information about an academic degree she obtained from the National University of Defense Technology, the higher education institution of the People’s Liberation Army.
Prosecutors further contend that during her research stay in the United States, Dr. Ye continued to receive and carry out orders from her superiors in the Chinese military. The U.S. government brought charges against the researcher over visa fraud, making false statements, and conspiracy with a foreign government, but she has not been arrested, because she is in China.
“Publish or perish:” a cancer of Academia
Another case is that of Zaosong Zheng. The Harvard University-affiliated researcher was discovered trying to leave the country with 21 stolen blisters from a laboratory at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center in Boston.
The blisters contained material from relevant research related to the development of cancer. After being arrested, the academician admitted trying to escape with these samples to publish the research under his name in China and boost his scientific career. Zhen faces charges of contraband and false testimony and is currently in the custody of the U.S. government.
What happens when it is only an unfortunate mistake?
The United States Government has repeatedly commented on the need to aggressively protect the knowledge generated in the country that could be stolen and used by other world powers. Cases like the above might be right to pursue, but how strict can they be about international academic collaborations without falling into an extreme paranoia?
In August of last year, Feng Tao, who worked as a chemist at the University of Kansas, was accused of fraud for his alleged failure to report a full-time position he had held at a Chinese university while receiving U.S. federal funding. Unlike Dr. Lieber’s case, the academician did not provide false information and showed no malice or bad intent in the omission of information about his position in China.
His lawyer, Peter R. Zeidenberg, declined to comment on Dr. Tao’s specific case. Still, he suggested that U.S. prosecutors might be unreasonably pursuing Chinese academicians with international ties who only made a mistake of communication and are not necessarily spies. “The professors have free periods in the summer; sometimes they take jobs in China during that time, and they don’t believe it is necessary to report it,” the lawyer said. Zeidenberg added that being uninformed about the obligation to report overseas assignments can be very costly to teachers and academicians, who can be charged with fraud and face imprisonment for up to 20 years, and even more if the charges are filed for smuggling, espionage, treason or conspiracy.
A zero-tolerance policy
Beginning in 2018, U.S. Attorney General Jeff Session initiated a strategy to confront the possibility of international espionage, especially from China. Today, there are hundreds of open research investigations involving the work of academicians of Chinese origin or of those who have ties to Chinese institutions.
In many cases, they investigate and pursue conduct that occurred many years ago when the criteria for security were not the ones that apply today. Frank Wu, a law professor and former President of the Committee of 100, an organization of prominent Chinese-Americans, has classified these new strategies as
unnecessarily aggressive and potentially devastating to the development of American science. China contributes financially to U.S. scientific output, and a considerable number of academic collaborators have connections to China.
The fear of espionage and theft of knowledge on the part of the United States comes not only from the notion of China as a potential enemy in the scientific arena but also from the idea that only in the United States is state-of-the-art technological knowledge occurring, which increases the danger that other world powers would try to appropriate it.
Taking into account the current geopolitical landscape, precautionary measures to protect information may be useful. Still, authorities and institutions of higher education must find a way to ensure the proper use of information in the instances of international scientific cooperation without dismantling the platforms that make possible this cooperation and generation of scientific knowledge in the first place.
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This article from Observatory of the Institute for the Future of Education may be shared under the terms of the license CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 
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